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2/78INTRODUCTION: Launched in Tokyo in September 1973, the GATT MuLtiLateraL
Trade Negotiations (MTN's) did not get underway untiL February 1975 (see
Annex I for a historicaL-summary), after the adoption of the Trade Act giving
the United States government a negotiating mandate.
At the London Western summit in May 1977, the assembLed Heads of State gave
a new impuLsion to the MTN's and emphasised their desire to see tangibLe
progress within the year. "It was important to react to the threat of pro-
tectionism by giving a push towards a successfuL outcome. The continuing
economic difficuLties make it even more essentiaL to achieve the objectives
of the Tokyo DecLarat.ion and to negotiate a comprehensive set of agreements
to the maximum benefit of aLL," decLared Mr. Roy Jenkins, President of the
Commission of the European Communities.
According to the timetabLe estabLished, aLL eLements of the negotiation
must be deLimited and identified by mid-January 1978. On the basis of these
eLements (the "working hypotheses"), participants wiLL go forward to sub-
stantive negotiations (see Annex II - stages of negotiation), which precedes
the finaL phase in which a baLance of concessions is sought (the second
haLf of 1978).
The EEC has formaLLy presented on 20 January 1978 its offers in Geneva for
the tariffs, agricuLture and non-tariff sectors of the MuLt1LateraL Trade
Negotiations. These offers foLLow the decision of the CounciL of Ministers
on 17 January 1978 that the Community shouLd enter the substantive phase of
the GATT Trade Negotiations.
The negotiations form one undertaking, aLL the eLements of which must move
ahead together•. The Tokyo Declaration, the "charter" on the basis of which
negotiations are conducted, affirms this gLobaL approach; it cLearLy states
that participants must endeavour to achieve an overaLL, baLanced package of
concessions at the same time as obtaining the highest degree of trade Libe-
raLisation. So, it is on the basis of the whoLe range of working hypotheses
that have been put forward - certain eLements of which remain to be fina -
Lised - that substantive negotiations wiLL now take pLace.
The Tokyo DecLaration contains the foLLowing objectives, amongst others, for
the current round of negotiations:
a) conduct negotBtions on tariffs by empLoyment of appropriate formuLae of
as generaL appLication as possibLe;
b) reduce or eLiminate non-tariff measures or, where this is not appropriate,
to reduce or eLiminate their trade restricting or distorting effects, and
to bring such measures under more effective internationaL discipLine;
c) incLude an examination of the possibiLities for the coordinated reduction
or eLimination of aLL barriers to trade in seLected sectors as a compLe-
mentary technique;
d) incLude an examination of the adequacy of the muLtiLateraL safeguard sys-
tem, considering particuLarLy the modaLities of appLication of ArticLe
XIX, with a view to furthering trade LiberaLisation and preserving its
resuLts;
e) incLude, as regards agricuLture, an approach to negotiation~ which, whiLe
in Line with the generaL objectives of the negotiations, shouLd take ac-
count of the speciaL characteristics and probLems in this sector;
f) treat tropicaL products as a speciaL and priority sector.- 3 -
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) based the negotiating structure of
the Tokyo Round on this enumeration of aims. In addition in November 1976
it created a new negotiating unit, the "Framework Group· charged with im-
proving GATT's LegaL framework to heLp deveLoping countries.
I. Tariff Negotiations:
1) The Lowering of customs tariffs remains an important aspect of the
current negotiations, despite considerabLe progress made during pre-
vious rounds (in particuLar the DiLLon and Kennedy Rounds). Indeed,
whiLe the average LeveL of customs tariffs is in generaL moderate va-
rious countries stiLL have customs duties which constitute a serious
obstacLe to free trade in the sense that they give seLective and dif-
ferentiated protection to certain products.
2) The tariff positions of the MTN partners remain very different
a) At the LeveL of tariff structures:
- The European Community has a homogeneous customs tariff as a re-
suLt of its deveLopment process. On more than haLf its MFN im-
ports, there is no duty at aLL and where there are, tariff LeveLs
are LargeLy concentrated between 5 and 10 per cent (30 per cent
of totaL duties).
There are hardLy any duties higher than 20 per cent.
- On the contrary, tariff structures such as those of the U.S.,
Canada, AustraLia, while containing a fairLy Large number of Low
or zero duties aLso contain quite a high proportion of high ta-
riffs with high 'points' exceeding 50% in some cases.
b) At the LeveL of the degree of tariff binding (1):
- The European Community and the United States have a high degree
of binding (90-100%)
- Other deveLoped countries such as Canada, New ZeaLand, and in par-
ticuLar AustraLia have a Lower degree of consoLidation, which is
of the order of 20% of totaL imports in certain cases. Among the
developing countries, onLy a certain number of them have bound
some of their tariffs.
This state of affairs creates an imbaLance as far as the obligations
of the partners are concerned. Therefore it is naturaL .that this too
shouLd form part of the tariff negotiation.
3) Towards the harmonisation of tariff disparities
The European Community's fundamentaL aim in the tariff negotiations
is to reduce the significant disparities that exist between high and
Low duties (harmonisation), in order to achiev0 a more baLanced situ-
ation.
(1) A bound customs duty is one that has been incLuded in a List annexed to
the GATT. An increase is only aLLowed after negotiation with countries
affected, and usuaLLy invoLves compensation. ConverseLy, an unbound cus-
toms duty can be raised at any ~ime, without notification or compensation.- 4 -
Several tariff reduction formulae were proposed during 1976.
The Swiss formula Z =ax (1) was finally chosen as the working
x+a
hypothesis by the u.S. and the EEC in September 1977 and Japan subsequent-
ly agreed to it. This formula has a harmonising effect: the higher the
original duties, the greater are the tariff reductions.
It also allows for more or less important tariff reductions, depending
upon the chosen "a" coeffiCient (2).
The Community is ready to begin negotiations on the reduction of tariffs for
industrial products by the application of the swiss formula. It agrees
initially to use a coefficient of 16 (which theoretically would produce an
average weighted reduction in tariffs of about 40 per cent).
In making this initial offer, the Community emphasizes that the final size
of the tariff reductions to be implemented will only be known at the end
of the negotiations. In addition the Community lays down that the tariff
cuts be spread over eight years and that there should be two stages for
implementing the cuts. After the first five annual reductions, the
Community will examine the general passing to the second stage of three
further tariff cuts.
The Community reserves-the right to assess the qualitative and quantitative
aspects of the offers which its developed partners will make and· to make
any necessary adjustments in its own offer. The Community does not intend,
however, to compensate for any eventual exceptions it may, as a consequence,
have to make •
(1) In this formula, Z represents the level of duty after reduction, IXI the
initial duty and la' the coefficient which must be determined.
(2) The greater the 'a' coefficient,the less the tariff reduction.
For example, supposing an original duty of 10 per
cent, that is a = 10, the formula gives the following result:
Z = 10 x 10 = 100 =5 (fina l duty)
10 + 10 20
With the same original duty, but in which, a = 12
Z = 10 x 12 =120 =5,5 (rounded figure)
10 + 12 22
a = 14, Z = 10 x 14 = 140 =6 (rounded figure)
10 + 14 24
a = 30, Z = 10 x 30 =300 =7,5 etc•••••
10 + 30 40- 5 -
- The problem of exceptions :
Already it is kno~n that an important part of United States trade will
be excepted from the formula; these are the "mandatory exceptions"
written into the Trade Act by Congress for reasons of national se~urity
(oil based products) or as a result of application of safeguard clauses
(specialty steels, colour Televisions, shoes, cettain cheap ceramic
products, balL bearings, etc.~.).
American negotiators have proposed compensating these statutory excep-
tions and other possible exceptions by greater reductions on other pro-
ducts. This is the "no net exceptions" principle.
The European Community, like most of its partners, does not favour this
proposal. They feel it may imbalance the negotiations and dilute the
harmonising effect of the formula. For its part, the Community has made
it cLear, in conformity with the Tokyo Declaration and its own negotia-
ting directives, that exceptions must be kept to a minimum.
- The formuLa's area of application:
It has been agreed that the tariff negotiating scheme will only apply
to industrial goods. For agricultural products, tariff reductions will
be achieved through the requests and offers procedure (1). Lists or
requests were submitted in November 1977. The major part of participants
began to submit their offers by mid-January 1978.
(1) As is further elaborated under the "Agriculture" heading, the Community
distinguishes between products suitable for incLusion in a multilateraL
arrangement (cereals, meat, dairy products) and other agricuLtural pro-
ducts. The Community argues that only the Latter shouLd be open to the
requests and offers procedure.- 6 -
II. Non-tariff obstacLes to trade:
Past GATT negotiations have been overwheLmingLy concerned with the re-
duction of customs duties (1).
But whiLe tariff barriers have been reduced, the reLative importance of
non-tariff measures has increased. In addition, the growing intervention
of the State in economic Life has brought about the more frequent appea-
rance of new measures (for exampLe sanitary specifications, environmen-
taL measures) which can indirectLy hamper internationaL trade.
In a cataLogue drawn up'on the basis of notifications, the GATT Secre-
tariat has recorded more than 800 different non-tariff measures, appLied
by various participants. Participants in the MTN's decided to concentra-
te their efforts on the most gLaring probLem areas: quantitative restric-
tions, technicaL barriers, various customs questions, countervaiLing
duties and subsidies. Certain measures are wideLy appLied and concern a
Large number of countries. Thus, participants have Looked for wide ran-
ging soLutions. Draft Codes have been prepared for technicaL barriers,
customs vaLuation, government procurement and countervaiLing duties and
subsidies.
Other measures, on the contrary, onLy exist in a certain number of coun-
tries and are the object of specific requests and offers.
A) Draft Codes:
1) f~§!Qm§_Y21~2!iQD:
The way merchandises is vaLued for the purpose of Levying duty is the
main customs probLem deaLt with in the current round of negot iations(2).
- MuLtipLicity of existing systems
At the moment, certain countries have a system of customs vaLuation
based to a greater or Lesser extent on the system of the BrusseLs
Convention on VaLuation (3).
(1) In fact, in addition to the tariff reductions achieved, the Kennedy
Round (1963-1967) resuLted in two Limited agreements on non-tariff
measures:
the Anti-Dumping Code, eLaborating the ruLes contained in ArticLe VI
of the GATT, but which in the eyes of the EEC and some of its partners
has onLy been incompLeteLy appLied by some signatories to it.
- the suppression of the American SelLing Price (ASP) which was never
ratified by the u.S. Congress.
(2) Other customs questions, (for example requirements concerning import
documentation), concern a Limited number of countries; they are for
this reason, subject to the request and offer procedure agreed for non-
tariff measures.
(3) ELaborated in 1950 by the CounciL of Customs Cooperation, based in
BrusseLs, the Convention on Customs VaLuation fixes a series of crite-
ria for the calcuLation of value. 30 countries (the EEC incLuded) are
members of the Convention and a further 70 respect its provision~.- 7 -
However, some important trading nations (notabLy the USA, Canada,
South Africa and New ZeaLand) have their own system, compLeteLy
different from that of their partners. The United States in parti-
cuLar has an extremeLy compLex vaLuation system (1), which gene-
rates uncertainty and constitutes an obstacLe to commerce. Some
vaLuation methods of this system, in particuLar the American SeL-
Ling Price (ASP) (2), are contrary to generaLLy accepted GATT
ruLes (3).
During the Kennedy Round, the United States'partners requested the
aboLition of the ASP, but Congress has so far refused; the ASP
remains in force.
The Canadian system, based in part on the "fair commerciaL vaLue"
is simiLarLy open to criticism.
The Community proposed a draft Code for the impLementation of
ArticLe VII of the GATT, which contains a series of guiding prin-
cipLes on customs vaLuation.
This Code seeks to estabLish a uniform internationaL system based
on a "positive" definition of value (4), thus reducing considera-
bLy the arbitrary eLements and restrictive effects inh~rent in the
present systems. This draft has been accepted as a basis for nego-
tiation by severaL of the Community partners.
2) §2Y~!D~~Q!_~!2£~!~~~Q!:
Purchases by government and the pubLic sector represent an increa-
singLy Large proportion of total trade.
The GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations aim to establish the prin-
cipLe of equaLity of treatment for foreign and nationaL suppLiers~
indeed to put it into effect through the institution of adequate pro-
cedures. To this end, participants have eLaborated an "integrated
draft Code' which synthesises the work done within the OECD on this
question and the discussions that have been held within the GATT
"Government procurement" sub-group.
the draft is largeLy based on propositions made jointLy by the Nordic
countries, Canada and the EEC.
It recommends the institution of internationaL procedures of notifi-
cation, consuLtation, surveiLLance and dispute settLement, to ensure
greater transparency in the procedures for the award of contracts(5).
Notably, it lays down the criteria as to quaLifications and the terms
for suppLiers and appeaL procedures designed to eLiminate discrimination.
(1)Methods for the caLcuLation of vaLue vary according to the type of goods.
There are nine different possibLe ways of calculating the vaLue of goods.
(2) The ASP applies in particuLar to certain products of organic chemistry.
(3) ArticLe VII of the GATT prohibits the use of the price of domestic goods
as the basis for caLcuLating customs valuation.
(4) A "positive" definition is based on objective criteria for the determi -
nation of value.
(5) The draft aims, in particular, to improve understanding of the various
nationaL laws, reguLations, procedures and practices concerning govern-
ment procurement, through adequate pubLicity before, during and after
the concLusion of the transaction.
~
I
I
j- 8 -
,
Various problems still have to be resolved:
- the Code does not settle the question of the definition of the pur-
chasing entities subject t6 the above mentioned disciplines and
the degree of commitment assured by centralised States, on the one
hand, and f~deral States on the other.
- the degree of "transparency" deemed necessary has still to be deter-
mined (detailed publication of procurement decisions or simple
information to other signatories in the case of complaint).
3) §~~§iQi~§_~~Q_£Q~~!~ry~ili~9_Q~!i~§:
This is one of the most difficult questions of the negotiation. It
has produced a series of squabbles. The probLem for the MTN is to
define subsidies and conditions for the application of countervai-
ling duties.
The GATT does not prohibit in a general way the use of subsidies (1).
It provides simply for their control by means of notification and
consultation where need be. Nevertheless, for certain countries
which accepted it, the 1970 Declaration contains the obligation, sub-
ject to certain conditions, not to apply export subsidies.
In addition if the subsidy causes or threatens to cause serious in-
jury to producers of the importing country, a countervailing duty
equivalent to the amount of the subsidy may be levied by the impor-
ting country. The main problem in this sector stems from the fact that the
United States has legislation on countervailing duties which does not
conform to Article VI of the GATT. Any export subsidy, even if it
causes no injury nor risks doing so, is open to countervailing duties.
The United States partners are insistent that the U.S. bring its le-
gislation on countervailing duties into line with GATT rules.
For their part, the United States want to see certain subsidies eli-
minated altogether. In addition, they want the list of subsidies co-
vered by GATT disciplines widened to include both domestic subsidies
(even where they are essentially regional), and other internal aids
(for example measures tending to encourage national production at the
expens~ of imports).
The United States and the Community have discussed the question at
great length in the hope of finding common ground.
An "Outline of discussion", on subsidies and countervailing duties
which envisages starting from existing GATT rules and procedures in
an attempt to improve their efficiency, is among the negotiating
documents. This outline recognises that while certain subsidies can
help fulfil the objectives of national policy, they can equally
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the commercial interests
of other contracting parties. Thus, it is necessary to avoid the im-
plementation of subsidies likely to cause injury to others.
As far as countervailing duties are concerned the criteria for injury
have yet to be established, and their application would have to be
examined in depth.
(1) Subsidies are governed by Article XVI of the GATT.- 9 -
Standards, technicaL reguLations and quaLity controLs to which pro-
ducers must conform and which can seriousLy impede internationaL trade,
exist in increasing number and variety from country to country.
A variety of organisations (1) have as their objective the harmoni-
sation of nationaL standards and the drafting of internationaL standards.
But every country is free to choose whether to adhere to these standards
or not, so much so that there stiLL exist substantiaL differences
among nationaL standards and technicaL reguLations.
The MTN's have two main objectives in this sector:
- to promote the harmonisation of existing nationaL standards by
recommanding the adoption by the participating countries, where
possibLe, of the standards drawn up by internationaL organisations,
- to avoid the creation of obstacLes to trade by means of new
reguLations.
The draft Standards Code, drawn up with these objectives in mind,
pLaces its main emphasis on the estabLishment of a procedure for
internationaL cooperation; it provides for notification and consuL-
tation procedures, recognition of certificates of conformity and
dispute settLement procedures.
NevertheLess, certain fundamentaL questions have not yet been
resoLved :
- the LeveL of obLigations to be undertaken by the federaL governments
in regard to provinciaL authorities or states. The Community is
very aware of this risk of imbaLance in the obLigations to be
undertaken by signatories of the code.
- the question whether the Code can be appLied to agricuLturaL
products, taking account of the specific nature of technicaL
reguLations in this fieLd (2)
There are two types of import Licence:
Licences appLied in administering quantitative restrictions (3)
where grant of the Licence is dependant on the amount of imports
authorised.
- IJautomatic" Licences, which in principLe constitute simpLe adminis-
trative formaLities.
(1) In particuLar ISO (InternationaL Standardisation Organisation) and
the European Standards Committee
(2) In particuLar sanitary and phytosanitory reguLations
(3) On quantitative restrictions, see beLow, point B-1- 10 -
These two types of licence may give rise to decisions of an arbitrary
character (the importer is not informed of the conditions under which
a licence may be granted, nor of the reasons for refusal of a licence,
nor even of the administrative decision) and cause considerable delays
and additional costs in the process of importation.
On the basis of discussion in the Sub-group "Quantitative restrictions",
which also deals with import licensing, the GATT Secretariat has
established two preliminary draft texts aiming to eliminate arbitrary
practices and administrative delays in the administration of the two
types of import licensing regime mentioned above.
The ~im of these drafts is to ensure a degree of transparency of
administrative procedures.
B) Non-tariff measyres subject to specific requests
In accordance with Article XI of the GATT which provides for general
elimination of existing quantitative restrictions (QR), a substantial
number of these, based principally on balance of payments difficulties,
have been gradually eliminated.
The restrictions still in force essentially concern a limited number
of countries. In the case of the European Community, certain member
States still apply a limited number of QR's in regard to certain
countries.
The objectives of the MTN's in this sector is to eliminate these
restrictions or enlarge existing import quotas, by means of specific
requests and offers.
The Community has received requests from about 20 countries on tariff
positions wholly or partly subject to restriction in one or more
of the member states. The European Community is prepared to offer
the immediate of progressive liberalisation of 33 of these tariff
positions during the MTN (subject to agreement with certain partici-
pants on satisfactory conditions for such liberalisation and subject
to achieving an adequate balance of mutual advantages in the MTN).
Certain other customs matters other than customs valuation have also
been the subject of specific requests.
They concern problems of tariff classification, the harmonisation and
simplification of requirements for import documentation (in particular
consular formalities) and the elimination of certain vexatious requi-
rements and delays in the processing of specific cases.
As regards customs matters other than customs valuation the Community
proposes, given the highly technical nature of many of the requests,- 11 -
particuLarLy reLating to tariff cLassification, that discussions shouLd
begin between the participants mainLy concerned with a view to identifying
soLutions to probLems in this area on the basis of mutuaL advantage.
As regards other non-tariff measures, the Community is ready to pursue
discussions on these matters with the participants mainLy interested
to see whether possibiLities exist for a negotiation on the basis
of reciprocity.
III. The Negotiations on AgricuLture:
In accordance with the Tokyo DecLaration, the negotiations on
agricuLture shouLd be conducted in a way which conforms with the
generaL objectives of the MTNs, whiLe taking account of the speciaL
characteristics and probLems of the agricuLturaL sector.
AgricuLturaL production is subject to a certain inherent instabiLity;
unLike industriaL production where adjustments between suppLy and
demand can come about with reLativeLy short deLays, agricuLturaL
production on the other hand is characterised by Longer cycLes and
a certain rigidity in the mechanism of adjustment. For this reason
worLd agricuLturaL markets pass through successive phases of over-
production and shortage.
An improvement in the provision of information between producing and
consuming countries, in regard to foreseeabLe deveLopment of suppLy
and demand, is essentiaL to harmonious deveLopment and expansion of
the market. Without this, LiberaLisation of access to foreign markets
can onLy be precarious, as it is sufficient that there be a crisis of
over-production in the worLd to ensure that the markets of producing
countries be cLosed, or that there be a severe shortage for export
restrictions to be introduced in countries which are traditionaL
exporters.
Conscious of the need to go to the root of the probLem the European
Communities have made an important contribution in the MTNs in the
search for muLtiLateraL soLutions which wouLd reduce the excessive
fLuctuation of three important markets: cereaLs, dairy products,
meat products (in particuLar bovine meat), in which the Communities
have an interest both as exporter and importer. For other agricuLturaL
products, which concern a Less important voLume of trade and a smaLLer
number of countries, the negotiations are proceeding on the basis of
a specific request and offer procedure simiLar to the one which was
estabLished for those non-tariff measures which are not subject to
codes of conduct.
A) Progress in negotiating internationaL agreements:
Three sub-groups were created to conduct negotiations in the cereaLs,
dairy products and meat products sectors.- 12 -
1) .f~.!:~~!2 :
The negotiations concern the main cereals (wheat, maize, barley and
sorghum).
After an exchange of views on the problems of stabilisation and
liberalisation of this market, as well as the treatment to be
accorded to developing countries, which are on the whole heavily
dependent on imports for their supply, the work of the sub-group
was temporarily halted while awaiting the results of the United
Nations Conference ~hich will meet in Geneva from 13 February next
to negotiate a new Arrangement.
When the time comes, the sub-group will then study how to integrate
the work of the conference with its own.
2) R~i.!:l_f.!:Q9~E!2_~D9_~~~!_f.!:Q9~E!2:
On the basis of proposals of the EEC and New Zealand (for dairy
products), and of the EEC and Australia (meat products)r draft
international agreements have been drawn up for these product
sectors. These draft agreements constitute in principle the
working hypotheses of MTN participants in these sectors, but the
United States seems to retain a certain reticence in engaglng
itself on this basis in regard to dairy products.
The drafts contain a general provision for information and consul-
tation; they also provide for insertion in the Agreement of certain
limited arrangements existing at present (subject to re-negotiation
of certain elements contained therein - coverage, prices and
obligations relating thereto, derogation clauses, food aid).
Finally, common disciplines are proposed for products which,
like cheese and meat, are not very homogeneous and for which it
is difficult to find general solutions.
B) Specific requests and offers in the agricultural field:
Group "Agriculture" initially set in motion a process of examination,
information and dialogue on all the tariff and non-tariff measures
which concern products othe~ than those covered by the three
sub-groups (cereals, dairy products, meat products).
Notifications and consultations took place between the countries
concerned and this procedure has resulted and will result in the
submission of lists of requests (from 1 November, 1977) and to
offers (from 15 January, 1978).
1) For its·own part the Communities have addressed requests to six
developed countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, South Africa
and New Zealand), five socialist countries and twenty-six deve-
loping countries (principally of Central and Latin America and
Asia).
The tariff reductions which the Communities would wish to obtain
from developed countries are of the order of 25 to 50 %.- 13 -
In regard to non-tariff measures, the Communities have, for exampLe,
requested the United States to bring its LegisLation on counter-
vaiLing duties into conformity with the ruLes of the GATT
(c.f. chapter "Subsidies and Countervailing Duties" of this note),
as weLL as eLimination of the discriminatory effects of the "Wine
GaLLon Assessment" method.
In addition, the Community recaLLs the importance which they attach
to the work on standards and technicaL regulations(1), certain
provisions of which (protection of appeLlations of origin for
exampLe) could be appLied to agricuLtural products.
The Community received agricuLturaL requests from 31 countries
(4 Eastern European countries, 9 deveLoped countries and 18 deve-
Loping countries) concerning tariff and non-tariff measures (2)
covering a fairLy Large range of products, incLuding those covered
by the sub-groups (cereaLs, dairy products, meat products).
2) The Community's offer of concessions for agricuLturaL products
other than those being deaLt with muLtiLateraLLy such as grains,
meat and dairy products, consists in tariff reductions and new
tariff bindings to appLy to about 100 products. These incLude
horse meat, edibLe offaLs, pLants, vegetabLes, fruits, sauces and
bourbon whisky.
The Community offer of tariff reductions and bindings covers imports
of about 1.000 miLLion european units of account (EUR). (3)
(1) Cf. Chapter on "TechnicaL Barriers" of this note
(2) In particuLar technicaL barriers to trade, such as sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.
(3) In gLobaL terms, the Community's offer in the agricuLturaL sector
is not, of course, Limited to the above List.
If one takes into account the Community's participation in the
negotiations on a muLtiLateraL basis for internationaL agreements
in grains, dairy products, meat and rice, the offer on agricuLturaL
products wouLd amount to about 5 thousand miLLion EUR on the basis
of the 1976 imports. In addition to this, the tropicaL products
offer of the Community wouLd account for about 2.4 thousand miLLion
EUR, an offer which is being impLemented without reciprocity since
January 1977.
It is perhaps worth recaLLing that in previous negotiations the
Community agreed to bind tariffs on agricuLturaL products,
the imports of which totaLLed about 16 thousand miLLion EUR. Of
this voLume, about 4.4 thousand miLLion EUR concerned products
for which the tariff rate was bound at zero.- 14 -
IV. Improvement of the internationaL safeguard system:
The Tokyo DecLaration provides that the MTN shaLL incLude an examination
of the degree of satisfactoriness of the muLtiLateraL safeguard system
(1) in order to faciLitate LiberaLisation of trade and to secure its
resuLts.
In fact, severaL countries, among them the European Community, consider
that improvement of the internationaL safeguard system constitutes,
given the difficuLt economic situation in which the majority of
countries find themseLves, a precondition for an increased LiberaLi-
sation of trade.
This is aLL the more so since the present safeguard system, as
presentLy formuLated in ArticLe XIX of the GATT, has not functioned
in a very satisfactory way up to now.
In fact, the safeguard cLause of ArticLe XIX authorises Contracting
Parties of the GATT to take emergency measures to limit the imports of
particuLar products when they cause or threaten to cause serious
injury to national producers. While apparently Liberal, Article XIX
Limits the freedom of action of governments in two ways:
- on the one hand, because safeguard measures must usuaLLy be appLied
against aLL suppLiers, without distinction between those who are
responsibLe for injury and whose who are not;
- on the other hand, by providing for a right to compensation for
affected suppLiers, even when aLL the conditions of ArticLe XIX are
fuLfiLLed.
The existing safeguard clause thus constitutes a non-selective instru-
ment which is awkward in its use.
It is not surprising that many countries have hesitated to resort to
ArticLe XIX to justify emergency measures and have prefered to resort
to other Less restrictive methods or to seek ways of soLving their
probLems by new soLutions which are not provided for in the GATT.
One has thus assisted at the deveLopment of "voLuntary" autoLimitation
arrangements concLuded between countries/firmswhich are suppLiers and
their clients. Some of these agreements are also known as "OrderLy
r~arketing Agreements" (OMA).
Two different proposaLs have been made. One supports seLective appLi-
cation of safeguard measures, whiLe proposing to compensate this
softening of the ruLes by the creation of an international surveiLlance
body which wouLd have the task of avoiding abusive resort to selective
measures.
The other supports the maintenance of the present safeguard system, in
particuLar in regard to the general appLication of safeguard measures;
an internationaL surveiLLance body wouLd be created to insure an equi-
tabLe appLication of the GATT ruLes.
(1) The internationaL safeguard system, based on ArticLe XIX of the
GATT, authorises parties to derogate from the ruLes of the GATT
regarding freedom of trade in certain exceptionaL conditions.- 15 -
V. SectoraL approach :
According to the Tokyo DecLaration, the negotiations shouLd comprise,
as a compLementary technique, an examination of the possibiLities of
coordinated reduction or eLimination of aLL obstacLes to trade in
certain specific sectors.
Canada is one of the principaL defenders of the sectoraL approach.
It wouLd [ike to see entire production sectors where it feeLs parti-
cuLarLy competitive (such as wood products and their derivatives,
certain mineraLs and metaLs LiberaLised at aLL stages of production.
The GATT Secretariat prepared a series of studies on products of inte-
rest to one or other partner.
When the time comes, the participants in the negotiations wiLL be abLe
to examine the possibiLities of increased LiberaLisation in certain
sectors which this technique of the sectoraL approach offers.
VI. TropicaL products:
Negotiations in this sector were compLeted in spring 1976. Whith
the exception of the USA, aLL deveLoped countries which made conces-
sions on tropicaL products, which constitutes a priority sector for
deveLoping countries, impLemented those concessions on the
1st January 1977.
VII. Taking account of the particuLar interests of deveLoping countries:
The Tokyo decLaration provides that the MTN's ~ouLd ensure differen-
tial and more favourabLe treatmert for deveLoping countries wherever
that is possibLe and desirabLe.
It was agreed in summer 1977 that the practicaL means of implementing
this treatment wouLd be decided on after the procedures of generaL
appLication.
The possibilities of granting such treatment have already been the
subject of discussions in aLL sectors of the negotiations and severaL
concrete proposaLs on the granting of such treatment have been made in
particular by the Community.
Furthermore, negotiations are underway improving the internationaL
framework governing trade of developing countries. The object of these
negotiations is in particuLar to give a stabLe juridicaL base to the
special and differentiaL treatment given on the course of the MTN's
to deveLoping countries.September 1973
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HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Tokyo DecLaration
Annex I
February 1975
October 1975
March 1976
November 1976
January 1977
May 1977
JuLy 1977
November 1977
January 1978
First meeting of the Trade Negotiation Committee
LDC's present their List of requests on tropicaL
products to deveLoped countries
Submission of offers by deveLoped countries
(tropicaL products)
Creation of sub-group "Government procurement"
and the "Framework" group
Coming into force of offers by deveLoped countries
on tropicaL products
Western Summit in Downing Street, in course of
which Heads of State agree to give new impulsion
to the MTN's
Visit by Mr. Robert Strauss to the Commission of
the European Communities.
Restarting of the AgricuLture and Non-Tariff
negotiations in the GATT - Drawing up of a
caLendar
Submission of Lists of agricuLturaL and non-
tariff requests
Submission of Lists of agricuLturaL and non-tariff
offersAnnex II
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TOKYO ROUND TIMETABLE
The different stages of negotiations - towards the fourth phase -
The GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations currently underway follow a logical
sequence, split up into various stages.
These stages are as follows :
1st stage
2nd stage
3rd stage
4th stage
5th stage
Identification of fields of negotiation; creation of negotia-
ting machinery; determination of participants' objectives
sector by sector.
Choice of working methods for the different working groups
(eg a bilateral or plurilateral approach based on lists of
requests and offers; the multilateral approach based on codes
of conduct, interpretative rules and international agreements;
tariff reduction, etc.)
The working out of negotiating rules and procedures for each
one of these working methods.
Drawing up "working hypotheses" (plan for tariff reduction;
schemes for a code or agreement; lists of requests and offers,
etc.)
Effective negotiation: evaluation of offers; examination of
possibilities for their improvement or reconciliation of
differences within the proposed rules,etc.
Seeking a balancing with a view to overall reciprocity, the
establishment of a politically acceptable final package.
At me moment, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN's) are about to
enter the Fourth stage, that of effective negotiation.- 18 - Annex III
DECLARATION OF MINISTERS
APPROVED AT TOKYO ON'14 SEPTEMBER 1973
1. The Ministers, having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee
for the Trade Negotiations and having noted that a number of governments
have decided to enter into comprehensive muLtiLateraL trade negotiations
in the framework of GATT and that other governments have indicated their
intention to make a decision as soon as possibLe, decLare the negotiations
officiaLLy open. Those governements which have decided to negotiate
have notified the Directdr- GeneraL of GATT to this effect, and the
Ministers agree that it wiLL be open to any other governement, through a
notification to the Director-GeneraL, to participate in the negotiations.
The Ministers hope that the negotiations wiLL invoLve the active partici-
pation of as many countries as possibLe. They expect the negotiations to
be engaged effectiveLy as rapidLy as possibLe~ and that, to that end,
the governments concerned wiLL have such authority as may be required.
2. The negotiations shaLL aim to :
- achieve the expansion and ever-greater LiberaLisation of worLd trade
and improvement in the standard of Living and weLfare of the peopLe of
the worLd, objectives which can be achieved, inter aLia, through the
progressive dismantLing of obstacLes to trade and the improvement of
the internationaL framework for the conduct of worLd trade.
- secure additionaL benefits for the internationaL trade of deveLoping
countries so as to achieve a substantiaL increase in their foreign
exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports, the acceLe-
ration of the rate of growth of their trade,taking into account their
deveLopment needs, an improvement in the possibiLities for these
countries to participate in the expansion of worLd trade and a better
baLance as between deveLoped and deveLoping countries in the sharing of
the advantages resuLting from this expansion, through, in the Largest
possibLe measure, a substantiaL improvement in the conditions of
access for the products of interest to the deveLoping countries and,
wherever appropriate, measures designed to attain stabLe, equitabLe
and remunerative prices for primary products.
To this end, co-ordinated efforts shaLL be made to soLve in an equitabLe
way the trade probLems of aLL participating countries, taking into
account the specific trade probLems of the deveLoping countries.
3. To this end the negotiations shouLd aim, inter aLia, to :
a) conduct negotiations on tariffs by empLoyment of appropriate formuLae
of as generaL appLication as possibLe;
b) reduce or eLiminate non-tariff measures or, where this is not appro-
priate, to reduce or eLiminate their trade restricting or distorting
effects, and to bring such measures under more effective international
discipLine;
c) incLude an examination of the possibiLities for the co-ordinated
tion or eLimination of aLL barriers to trade in seLected sectors
a compLementary technique;
reduc-
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d) include an examination of the adequacy of the multilateral safeguard
system, considering particularly the modalities of application of
Article XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalisation and
preserving its results;
e) include, as regards agriculture, an approach to negotiations which,
while in line with the general objectives of the negotiations,
should take account of the speciaL characteristics and problems in
this sector;
f) treat tropicaL products as a special and priority sector.
4. The negotiations shalL cover tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other
measures which impede or distort international trade in both industrial
and agriculturaL products, incLuding tropicaL products and raw materiaLs,
whether in primary form or at any stage of processing incLuding in pafti-
cular products of export interest m developing countries and measures
affecting their exports.
5. The negotiations shall be conducted on the basis of the principles of
mutual advantage, mutual commitment and overaLL reciprocity, while
observing the most-favoured-nation clause, and consistently with the
provisions of the GeneraL Agreement relating to such negotiations.
Participants shall jointLy endeavour in the negotiations to achieve,
by appropriate methods, an overall balance of advantage at the highest
possible leveL. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity
for commitments made by them in the negotiations to reduce or remove
tariff and other barriers to the trade of deveLoping countries, i.e.,
the developed countries do not expect the developing countries, in the
course of the trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsis-
tent with their individual development, financial and trade needs.
The Ministers recognize the need for speciaL measures to be taken in
the negotiations to assist the developing countries in their efforts to
increase their export earnings and promote their economic development
and, where appropriate, for priority attention to be given to products
or areas of interest to developing countries. They also recognize the
importance of maintaining and improving the GeneraLized System of
Preferences. They further recognize the importance of the application of
differentiaL measures to developing countries in ways which will provide
speciaL and more favourabLe treatment for them in areas of the negotia-
tion where this is feasibLe and appropriate.
6. The Ministers recognize that the particuLar situation and probLems of
the Least developed among the deveLoping countries shall be given special
attention to ensure that these countries receive speciaL treatment in
the context of any generaL or specific measures taken in favour of the
developing countries during the tariff negotiations.
7. The policy of LiberaLizing world trade cannot be carried out success-
fuLly in the ab~ence of paraLLeL efforts to set up a monetary system
which shields the worLd economy from the shocks and imbaLances which have
previousLy occurred. The Ministers will not lose sight of the fact that.
the efforts which are to be made in the trade fieLd imply continuing
efforts to maintain orderly conditions and to estabLish a durabLe and
equitabLe monetary system.- 20 -
The Ministers recognize equally that the new phase in the liberalisation
of trade which it is their intention to undertake should facilitate the
orderly functioning of the monetary system.
The Ministers recognize that they should bear these considerations in
mind both at the opening of and throughout the negotiations. Efforts
in these two fields will thus be able to contribute effectively to an
improvement of international economic relations, taking into account
the special characteristics of the economies of the developing countries
and their problems.
8. The negotiations shall be considered as one undertaking, the various
elements of which shall move forward together.
9. Support is reaffirmed for the principles, rules and disciplines provided
for under the General Agreement (1). Consideration shall be given to
improvements in the international framework for the conduct of world
trade which might be desirable in the light of progress in the negotia-
tions and, in tms endeavour, care shall be taken to ensure that any
measures introduced as a result are consistent with the overall objectives
and principles of the trade negotiations and particularly of trade
liberalisation.
10. A Trade Negotiations Committee is established, with authority, taking
into account the present Declaration, inter alia:
a. to elaborate and put into effect detailed trade negotiating plans and
to establish appropriate negotiating procedures, including special
procedures for the negotiations between developed and developing
countries;
b. to supervise the progress of the negotiations.
The Trade Negotiations Committee shall be open to participating govern-
ments.(2)
The Trade Negotiations Committee shall hold its opening meeting not
later than 1 November 1973.
11. The Ministers intend that the trade negotiations be concluded in 1975.
1. This does not necessarily represent the views of representatives of
countries not now parties to the General Agreement
2. Including the European Communities